trend
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the
!commandsyntax inSKILL.mdto execute shell scripts when the skill is loaded. The commandACTIVE=$(cat personas/_active.md 2>/dev/null || echo "default"); cat "personas/$ACTIVE/persona.md" 2>/dev/nullreads files from the local filesystem to populate the agent's context. - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The shell command uses variable substitution (
$ACTIVE) where the variable's value is derived directly from the contents ofpersonas/_active.md. If the content of this file is manipulated, it can result in arbitrary file reads within thepersonas/directory tree. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by blindly incorporating external data into its operational context.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from
personas/_active.mdandpersonas/$ACTIVE/persona.mdat load time via shell execution. - Boundary markers: The content of these files is injected directly into the prompt without any delimiters, markers, or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for file writing to
content/trends/and reading from the filesystem. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the file content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata