ads-suite-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection risks because it incorporates external data from source packs into its production workflow for generating prompts and overlays.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested through the 'source-pack/' directory, as noted in the workflow steps of SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not employ explicit delimiters or delimiters to isolate processed data from its own core instructions, which could allow instructions embedded in source data to influence agent behavior.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including writing to the local filesystem within 'logs/' and 'artifacts/' directories and invoking external image generation tools like '$fal-nano-banana-2-image-gen'.
- Sanitization: No mechanisms for sanitizing, validating, or escaping the input data are described in the instructions before the data is used to construct generative prompts or SVG assets.
Audit Metadata