docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source code string that is written to a temporary file and compiled into a shared library usinggccat runtime. This shared library is then loaded usingLD_PRELOADto shim socket calls during LibreOffice execution. Additionally,scripts/accept_changes.pydynamically generates a LibreOffice Basic macro and saves it to a temporary user profile at runtime to facilitate the automated acceptance of tracked changes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple Python scripts perform system command execution using
subprocess.run. For example,scripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesgccfor library compilation andsofficefor document processing, whilescripts/office/validators/redlining.pyinvokesgit diffto compare text between document versions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
SKILL.mdinstructs the user or agent to install the global Node.js packagedocx(npm install -g docx) to enable document generation and formatting capabilities. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and extracting data from untrusted
.docxfiles. - Ingestion points: Document XML content is extracted in
scripts/office/unpack.pyand read by various processing and validation scripts. - Boundary markers: None identified; document content is processed without consistent delimiters to distinguish user data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities for command execution and runtime code compilation, which could be abused if malicious instructions are successfully injected via the document processing pipeline.
- Sanitization: While
defusedxmlis used in some components, other parts of the validation logic rely on standardxml.etreeorlxml.etreewithout specific configurations to prevent XML-based exploits.
Audit Metadata