agent-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a 'Zero Manual Intervention' auto-discovery feature that scans the filesystem for any file named SKILL.md and automatically registers it into the agent's ecosystem.
- Ingestion points: The
scan_registry.pyscript crawls the workspace and subdirectories up to a depth of 3, reading metadata from any found skill files. - Boundary markers: Extracted metadata (name, description, capabilities) is incorporated into the registry without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts, which could allow a malicious skill to influence the orchestrator's decision-making.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator identifies and ranks skills based on these untrusted descriptions and generates execution plans for the agent to follow.
- Sanitization: No integrity checks or content validation are performed on the discovered SKILL.md files before they are trusted by the registry.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires the agent to execute several local Python scripts (
scan_registry.py,match_skills.py,orchestrate.py) provided with the skill. These scripts process user input and filesystem data to control the agent's tool-use strategy. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's frontmatter contains a
risk: safefield, which is a self-asserted safety claim that may attempt to bypass security review processes.
Audit Metadata