deep-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core workflow involves ingesting and processing untrusted external content (academic papers) through
scripts/extract_pdf.pyandWebFetch. An attacker could embed malicious instructions within a paper to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Full-text extraction from PDFs and HTML papers, as well as metadata from search APIs.
- Boundary markers: No explicit markers or instructions are provided to the agent to treat external paper content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bashto execute local scripts, has network access viaurllibandWebFetch, and can write files using theWritetool. - Sanitization: No content sanitization is performed on the extracted paper text before it is presented to the agent for synthesis.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads PDF files from URLs provided by academic search APIs via
scripts/download_papers.py. While targeting well-known academic services, the content itself is untrusted. - Evidence:
scripts/download_papers.pyfetches PDFs frompdf_urlfields in thepaper_db.jsonldatabase. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on executing multiple Python scripts from the shell to manage the research phases. While these scripts are part of the skill, the pattern of shell execution increases the attack surface.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructions frequently usepython /path/to/script.pywith various arguments.
Audit Metadata