linkfox-1688-procurement

HIGH W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).

• Secret detected (high risk: 1.00). I scanned the skill files for literal high-entropy credentials. I found one base64-like literal that is embedded as a fixed UID header in scripts/onboarding.py:
• scripts/onboarding.py defines _LOGIN_FIXED_UID with the literal "eyJhX2lkIjoiNmEyMmM4YjA1YmM5MTZhIiwiZF9pZCI6IiJ9". The code comment says this is a "固定 uid header（实测可用）" (fixed uid header, empirically usable). Because it is a non-placeholder, non-redacted, encoded token-like value that the code uses in authentication headers, it qualifies as a hardcoded credential and should be treated as a secret.

I did not flag other items because they are documentation placeholders, environment variable names, example IDs, or redacted/masked values:

• Environment variable names (LINKFOX_AGENT_API_KEY, LINKFOXAGENT_API_KEY, etc.) are not secret values in the repo.
• Example numeric order IDs, example phone number patterns, and the partially redacted taxpayer ID ("91440300MA5XXXXXX") are sample data/placeholders and not high-entropy secrets.
• URLs, user-agent strings, and other constants are non-sensitive configuration values.

MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

• Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). Yes. The skill explicitly exposes scripts/endpoints that perform money-moving or transactional actions: create_order.py (create 1688 orders), payment_url.py (retrieve payment URLs), confirm_receive.py (confirm receipt), cancel_order.py (cancel orders), and invoice_apply.py (apply for invoices). These are specific, purpose-built procurement/payment operations (not generic tools) and therefore constitute direct financial execution capability, even though the skill requires separate user confirmation for high-risk calls.