linkfox-echotik-get-video-download-url
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted metadata from TikTok videos (such as titles, descriptions, or user comments) via the EchoTik API. This data is returned to the agent and could potentially contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: API responses in
scripts/echotik_get_video_download_url.pyare returned to the agent context. - Boundary markers: Prompt instructions in
SKILL.mdlack explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the processed media metadata. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities and the ability to execute subprocesses via
scripts/response_io.py. - Sanitization: The script performs structural JSON validation but does not sanitize the textual content of the video metadata for injection patterns.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The
references/onboarding.mddocumentation contains instructions for users to modify their shell profiles (~/.zshrc,~/.bashrc) to store theLINKFOX_AGENT_API_KEYenvironment variable. While these are provided as user instructions for environment setup, they define a persistence mechanism that an agent could potentially automate. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/response_io.pyusessubprocess.runto execute other scripts within the skill package. While this is an architectural tool for managing large responses, it establishes a capability for command execution that relies on the parameters passed to the script.
Audit Metadata