linkfox-junglescout-keyword-history
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill's onboarding documentation (
references/onboarding.md) provides specific commands for the agent to present to the user that append export statements to shell initialization files such as~/.zshrcand~/.bashrc. These commands are designed to persist theLINKFOX_AGENT_API_KEYacross different terminal sessions. While this is a standard configuration method for CLI tools, it utilizes a persistence mechanism that modifies user shell profiles. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting user-supplied keywords and marketplace codes.
- Ingestion points: User-provided parameters defined in
SKILL.mdand passed toscripts/junglescout_keyword_history.py. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit warnings for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the keywords.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs network operations via
urllib.requestto a remote gateway and writes data and cache files to the local project directory. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the user-supplied data before it is processed and transmitted.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of local Python scripts (
scripts/junglescout_keyword_history.pyandscripts/onboarding.py) to perform its primary functions. These scripts execute shell-accessible operations, including retrieving environment variables, managing local file systems for caching, and conducting authenticated network communication with vendor APIs.
Audit Metadata