linkfox-sellersprite-product-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes product-level data (titles, brands, category paths) fetched from Amazon via the SellerSprite API, which constitutes untrusted external content.
- Ingestion points: API responses are processed in
scripts/sellersprite_product_search.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; the script parses and prints raw or summarized JSON without adding delimiters to prevent the agent from interpreting embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write files to the local workspace (
linkfox/directory) and perform network requests to vendor domains. - Sanitization: Content is parsed as structured JSON but the text fields are not sanitized for potential injection patterns.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to several vendor-managed infrastructure components to retrieve product data and manage account status.
- Evidence: Communications with
https://tool-gateway.linkfox.com,https://api.linkfox.com, andhttps://agent-api.linkfox.com. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a feedback mechanism that transmits conversation context, sentiment, and user intent to a vendor-controlled telemetry endpoint.
- Evidence: Telemetry data is sent to
https://skill-api.linkfox.com/api/v1/public/feedbackas part of the feedback loop described inreferences/api.md. - [PERSISTENCE]: The onboarding documentation provides explicit instructions for the agent to guide users in persisting API keys across sessions by modifying shell profiles.
- Evidence:
references/onboarding.mdinstructs adding exports to~/.zshrcand~/.bashrc, or usingsetxon Windows to store theLINKFOX_AGENT_API_KEYpermanently.
Audit Metadata