linkfox-temu-cancel-order-global

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes external data from Temu's APIs (via the LinkFox gateway), which could potentially contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Responses from API calls to tool-gateway.linkfox.com are loaded and printed to the session's stdout in scripts/_temu_common.py and scripts/_temu_global_common.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the API data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for network access (API requests), local file system writes (session logs), and reading local configuration files.
  • Sanitization: API response data is printed directly or summarized without specific sanitization of potentially executable text.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a sensitive local file path at ~/.linkfox/temu-access-tokens.json to store and retrieve Temu access tokens.
  • Evidence: scripts/_temu_token_store.py defines DEFAULT_STORE_PATH targeting the user's home directory for token persistence.
  • Note: The network exfiltration of these tokens to *.linkfox.com is considered normal vendor behavior as the domain belongs to the skill's author.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a suite of Python scripts for managing Temu orders, including authentication guides and file downloaders, which perform network operations and file system manipulations.
  • Evidence: scripts/_temu_common.py contains logic to search for and create directories in getcwd(), ~, and tempdir for session data storage.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 07:11 AM