linkly-ai
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
README.mdfile contains instructions to download installation scripts from the vendor's domain (updater.linkly.ai) to set up the Linkly AI CLI. - Evidence:
curl -sSL https://updater.linkly.ai/cli/install.sh | shandirm https://updater.linkly.ai/cli/install.ps1 | iex. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a remote CLI tool and MCP gateway to access content. The recommended installation methods for these tools involve piped shell execution from remote vendor-hosted scripts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the AI agent to execute shell commands using the
linklyCLI for environment detection, document search, and note management. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data from various document formats, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Document content retrieved from local and cloud sources via the
search,list, andreadtools (described inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill includes a 'Best Practices' section explicitly instructing the agent to treat document content as untrusted and to ignore any instructions or commands embedded within document text.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes CLI commands and MCP tools to perform file system searches, reading operations, and note writing (
note_save). It also performs network requests via the Linkly AI cloud gateway when using the--remoteflag. - Sanitization: No explicit code-level sanitization is implemented within the skill; it relies on the agent's adherence to the provided boundary instructions.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://updater.linkly.ai/cli/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata