blucli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill metadata defines an installation step that downloads a binary using
go install github.com/steipete/blucli/cmd/blu@latest. This dependency originates from a third-party repository not associated with the skill author or a trusted vendor, and it is not pinned to a specific version or hash.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to interact with the host system by executing theblucommand-line tool to perform device discovery, grouping, and playback operations.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external media players and third-party services, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from device discovery (
blu devices), device status updates (blu status), and search results from external music services (blu tunein search).\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between tool output and instructions, nor to ignore embedded commands within that output.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to perform network-based control of hardware devices, including volume adjustment, playback control, and device grouping.\n
- Sanitization: The instructions do not include mechanisms for filtering or sanitizing the output of the
blutool before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata