coding-agent
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documents the
elevated:trueparameter for thebashtool, which enables running shell commands on the host system instead of within a restricted sandbox environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation encourages the use of the
--yoloflag for the Codex CLI, which explicitly disables sandboxing and security approvals, allowing for unrestricted and potentially dangerous command execution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides workflows for cloning external, untrusted repositories (via
git cloneorgh pr checkout) and executing their contents using package managers likepnpm installand coding agents with safety flags disabled. This creates a high risk of executing malicious code embedded in Pull Requests or external projects. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions include the installation of third-party software from an unverified external source (
npm install -g @mariozechner/pi-coding-agent). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The "Auto-Notify on Completion" section describes a pattern of embedding system commands (
openclaw system event) directly into the prompts processed by coding agents. This increases the surface area for command injection, especially when the agent is processing external code or data. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use specific flags (
--yolo,--full-auto) and instruction patterns that are designed to bypass standard safety constraints and user approval steps.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata