himalaya
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection by enabling the agent to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources (incoming emails).
- Ingestion points: The
himalaya message readandhimalaya envelope listcommands inSKILL.mdbring external email content into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the email body.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides significant capabilities, including
himalaya message write,himalaya message delete,himalaya message move, andhimalaya message forward, which could be triggered by malicious email content. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or filtering email content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation in
references/configuration.mddetails thebackend.auth.cmdconfiguration option. This feature allows the underlying tool to execute arbitrary shell commands to retrieve passwords. While intended for security (e.g., integrating withpassorsecurity), it provides a mechanism for dynamic command execution based on local configuration files. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates access to sensitive communication data. The
himalaya message readandhimalaya message export --fullcommands allow the agent to access plain text and raw MIME data of emails, which could lead to data exposure if the agent's context is compromised.
Audit Metadata