ralph-runner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): Indirect Prompt Injection Surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from
prd.jsonfiles, specifically within theuserStoriesarray. Fields such astitle,description, andacceptanceCriteriaare natural language inputs intended to be processed by an AI agent. - Boundary markers: There are no documented delimiters or instructions (e.g., 'ignore embedded commands') to separate the PRD content from the agent's system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The tool chain involves high-privilege operations including spawning
Claude Codefor autonomous file modification and executing local shell commands likenpm test,lint, andtypecheckviaralph-cli. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is mentioned for the input JSON data before it is interpolated into agent prompts.
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill's core workflow involves executing external CLI tools (
ralph,claude) and local build/test scripts. While this is the intended functionality, it allows the autonomous agent to execute arbitrary commands based on the contents of the processed PRD. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill requires the pre-installation of
ralph-cli, an unverifiable third-party tool authored by 'linuxlewis'. While the skill does not contain an automated installation script (which would raise the severity), it introduces a dependency on untrusted software.
Audit Metadata