task-system
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted, free-form text from a local file (
inbox.md) and converts it into structured tasks and commands. This is a classic Indirect Prompt Injection surface where malicious instructions in the inbox could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Content from
.agents/tasks/inbox.mdis read via thetasks inboxcommand. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly mandate human-in-the-loop confirmation ("Present the draft tasks to the user for confirmation... Only create tasks after explicit confirmation") and clarify that vague items should prompt questions rather than immediate execution.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
tasksCLI to create, update, and close tasks, and uses shell redirection (echo. > ...) to modify or clear project files. - Sanitization: The skill relies on manual user review and confirmation of the 'drafted' tasks to sanitize the input from the inbox before final state changes are made.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a pre-installed or local
tasksCLI tool for all task management operations. It also utilizes shell commands to manage file state, such as clearing the inbox file usingecho. > .agents/tasks/inbox.md(Windows) or> .agents/tasks/inbox.md(Unix). - [SAFE]: The
tasks servecommand initiates a local web UI dashboard. While this is a network-related operation, it is documented as a standard feature of the task system for local visualization and does not involve external data exfiltration or remote downloads.
Audit Metadata