audio-generation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from untrusted external sources, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
markitdownto extract text from PDF and DOCX files and mentions usingwebfetchfor URLs inreferences/long-reads.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the ingested text.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess calls for
ffmpegandffprobeand performs file system operations (read/write) via Python scripts inreferences/long-reads.mdandreferences/podcast.md. - Sanitization: While the skill includes a
clean_for_narrationhelper, it is designed for editorial formatting (expanding abbreviations) rather than security sanitization. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions involve downloading and installing multiple third-party packages and cloning repositories from GitHub.
- Evidence: Mentions
git clonefor repositories likeFunAudioLLM/CosyVoice,fishaudio/fish-speech,index-tts/index-tts,myshell-ai/MeloTTS, andneuphonic/neutts-airacross various backend documentation files. - Context: These are established open-source projects in the text-to-speech community, and the downloads are consistent with the skill's purpose.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses shell commands for audio post-processing, which is standard for audio tasks but represents an active execution surface.
- Evidence: Extensive use of
ffmpegandffprobeCLI tools for concatenation, normalization, and format conversion throughout the reference guides, such as inreferences/ffmpeg-audio.md.
Audit Metadata