ipfs-host

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to use sudo systemctl for managing the IPFS service on Linux systems.
  • Evidence: sudo systemctl enable ipfs and sudo systemctl restart ipfs in SKILL.md.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The workflow involves configuring the IPFS daemon to run as a persistent system service to ensure availability across reboots.
  • Evidence: sudo systemctl enable ipfs in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local shell and PowerShell commands to interact with the Kubo IPFS CLI, system service managers, and network diagnostic tools.
  • Evidence: Execution of ipfs, systemctl, curl, and Get-Command across SKILL.md and scripts/add_pin_publish.sh.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied directories for publication, creating an attack surface where untrusted content could influence subsequent agent actions if the resulting CID or files are re-ingested.
  • Ingestion points: dist directory reference in SKILL.md; $TARGET_DIR variable in scripts/add_pin_publish.sh.
  • Boundary markers: None present to delimit or warn about untrusted directory content.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution (ipfs, sudo, systemctl), file reading via ipfs add, and network access via the IPFS daemon.
  • Sanitization: No content validation or sanitization is performed on the directory contents before they are pinned and published.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 09:15 PM