ipfs-host
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to use
sudo systemctlfor managing the IPFS service on Linux systems. - Evidence:
sudo systemctl enable ipfsandsudo systemctl restart ipfsin SKILL.md. - [PERSISTENCE]: The workflow involves configuring the IPFS daemon to run as a persistent system service to ensure availability across reboots.
- Evidence:
sudo systemctl enable ipfsin SKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local shell and PowerShell commands to interact with the Kubo IPFS CLI, system service managers, and network diagnostic tools.
- Evidence: Execution of
ipfs,systemctl,curl, andGet-Commandacross SKILL.md and scripts/add_pin_publish.sh. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied directories for publication, creating an attack surface where untrusted content could influence subsequent agent actions if the resulting CID or files are re-ingested.
- Ingestion points:
distdirectory reference in SKILL.md;$TARGET_DIRvariable in scripts/add_pin_publish.sh. - Boundary markers: None present to delimit or warn about untrusted directory content.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (ipfs, sudo, systemctl), file reading via
ipfs add, and network access via the IPFS daemon. - Sanitization: No content validation or sanitization is performed on the directory contents before they are pinned and published.
Audit Metadata