litestar-ai-serving
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents a pattern for ingesting untrusted user messages into an AI agent context equipped with functional tools.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
messagefield in thedataobject within thesend_chat_messagehandler inreferences/ai-serving.md. - Boundary markers: The implementation utilizes a structured
BASE_SYSTEM_INSTRUCTIONwith step-based directives (e.g.,## STEP 1) to guide agent behavior, though it does not demonstrate the use of hard delimiters for user input. - Capability inventory: The skill defines an
AIRunnerthat grants the agent access to tools such assearch_records_by_vector,get_record_details, and apurchasetool, enabling both data retrieval and transactional operations. - Sanitization: The provided reference code focuses on orchestration and does not include explicit logic for sanitizing or filtering external content before it is processed by the agent.
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