litestar-ai-serving

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents a pattern for ingesting untrusted user messages into an AI agent context equipped with functional tools.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the message field in the data object within the send_chat_message handler in references/ai-serving.md.
  • Boundary markers: The implementation utilizes a structured BASE_SYSTEM_INSTRUCTION with step-based directives (e.g., ## STEP 1) to guide agent behavior, though it does not demonstrate the use of hard delimiters for user input.
  • Capability inventory: The skill defines an AIRunner that grants the agent access to tools such as search_records_by_vector, get_record_details, and a purchase tool, enabling both data retrieval and transactional operations.
  • Sanitization: The provided reference code focuses on orchestration and does not include explicit logic for sanitizing or filtering external content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 07:08 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — litestar-ai-serving