litestar-queues
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of external data into background tasks, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via route handler parameters such as
account_id,report_id, andpathwhich are passed toQueueService.enqueueinSKILL.mdandreferences/execution-backends.md. - Boundary markers: The provided examples do not include explicit prompt boundary markers or "ignore instructions" directives when handling these identifiers within the task body.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables file system access (e.g.,
process_import(path)), network dispatch (e.g.,CloudTasksExecutionConfig), and database persistence across all configuration examples. - Sanitization: The configuration supports
max_argument_identity_bytesinSKILL.mdto limit the size of data used for task identity generation, providing resource bounding but no natural language sanitization. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the project's source code and documentation on GitHub and provides installation instructions for optional features.
- Evidence: Links to the
litestar-queuessource code, releases, and configuration files on GitHub are present inSKILL.md. Instructions for installing extra dependencies likelitestar-queues[cloudrun]andlitestar-queues[sqs]are included inreferences/execution-backends.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill describes CLI commands for managing worker processes and maintenance tasks.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddocuments commands such aslitestar queues run,litestar queues run-maintenance, andlitestar queues run-taskfor claiming and executing records. These are standard administrative tools for the described library.
Audit Metadata