skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external commands via
subprocess.Popeninscripts/run_eval.pyandsubprocess.runineval-viewer/generate_review.py. These calls invoke theclaudeCLI to perform evaluations and system utilities likelsofandkillto manage the local web server for the viewer. While integral to the skill's purpose, they grant the agent significant system-level capabilities.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing external, potentially untrusted data. It incorporates drafted skill instructions, test execution results, and user feedback into prompts for specialized subagents (graders and optimizers). - Ingestion points: Data is read from
evals/evals.json, current skill files, and thegrading.jsonoutput of previous runs. - Boundary markers: Skill content is interpolated into templates in
scripts/improve_description.pyand instructions inagents/grader.mdwithout explicit delimiters or instructions for the model to ignore potentially malicious content within the injected text. - Capability inventory: The skill environment possesses file writing permissions, the ability to execute shell commands via
subprocess, and the capacity to make outbound network requests to the Anthropic API. - Sanitization: Skill content and evaluation results are used in their raw form when constructing prompts for the language model.
Audit Metadata