rag-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is designed to process untrusted external data for Retrieval-Augmented Generation.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
ingest_file_task(defined incelery.md) and theLlamaIndexParserbase class (inllamaindex.md). - Boundary markers: The provided implementation code lacks explicit prompt delimiters or 'ignore instructions' directives for isolating ingested text from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are focused on parsing, embedding, and storing data. Analysis of the scripts shows no presence of subprocess calls, arbitrary code execution (exec/eval), or unauthorized network exfiltration logic.
- Sanitization: The skill includes a
_clean_metadatafunction inchromadb.mdthat ensures all metadata values are primitive types (str, int, float, bool) and serializes nested objects to JSON, providing protection against schema confusion and metadata-based injection attacks.
Audit Metadata