rag-skills

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is designed to process untrusted external data for Retrieval-Augmented Generation.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the ingest_file_task (defined in celery.md) and the LlamaIndexParser base class (in llamaindex.md).
  • Boundary markers: The provided implementation code lacks explicit prompt delimiters or 'ignore instructions' directives for isolating ingested text from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are focused on parsing, embedding, and storing data. Analysis of the scripts shows no presence of subprocess calls, arbitrary code execution (exec/eval), or unauthorized network exfiltration logic.
  • Sanitization: The skill includes a _clean_metadata function in chromadb.md that ensures all metadata values are primitive types (str, int, float, bool) and serializes nested objects to JSON, providing protection against schema confusion and metadata-based injection attacks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 07:06 PM