ai-research-explore
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands defined in campaign configuration files and researcher inputs to run research evaluations and detect system resources.
- Evidence:
scripts/orchestrate_explore.pyexecutesevaluation_source["command"]usingsubprocess.runto anchor exploratory trials. - Evidence:
scripts/passes/execution_feasibility.pyexecutes system utility commands likenvidia-smiandrocm-smito detect GPU hardware availability. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic loading and execution of Python code from the target research repository.
- Evidence:
scripts/passes/execution_feasibility.pyusesimportlib.util.spec_from_file_locationandspec.loader.exec_moduleto run modules from the user's repository duringimport_probe_checkandconstructor_probe_checkpasses. - Evidence:
scripts/write_outputs.pydynamically loads a shared module from a computed path relative to the skill installation directory. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches metadata and content from external research services and repositories.
- Evidence:
scripts/lookup/providers/arxiv_provider.pyfetches paper metadata fromexport.arxiv.org. - Evidence:
scripts/lookup/providers/doi_provider.pyresolves digital object identifiers viadoi.org. - Evidence:
scripts/lookup/providers/github_provider.pyfetches repository metadata and README files from the GitHub API (api.github.com). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill collects and logs detailed hardware and system environment information.
- Evidence:
scripts/passes/execution_feasibility.pygathers OS release details, CPU core counts, memory statistics, and GPU specifications, writing them to aRESOURCE_PLAN.mdartifact. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection from external research metadata.
- Evidence: Research metadata and README content fetched from external sources are incorporated into the agent's reasoning loop for ranking and grounding ideas without sanitization.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/lookup/providers/github_provider.py(README content),scripts/lookup/providers/arxiv_provider.py(paper summaries). - Boundary markers: Absent; external content is processed alongside researcher ideas without explicit delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution, file system writes (
explore_outputs/), and dynamic Python module execution. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill decodes Base64 data from the GitHub API but does not filter for malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata