lobehub-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the
lh connectcommand, which allows remote agents to execute tools on the user's local machine through a WebSocket gateway. This capability is explicitly described inreferences/device.mdas a way for agents to "execute local tools" via commands sent from the LobeHub service.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Thelh skill installcommand allows the agent to install and execute code from external sources, including GitHub repositories and ZIP archives. This mechanism enables the runtime acquisition and execution of unverified third-party content on the host system.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Several commands facilitate downloading content from remote sources.lh skill installfetches code from GitHub and external URLs, whilelh file uploadandlh doc uploadallow the agent to retrieve and process files from arbitrary web addresses.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes capabilities to read and transmit local data.lh kb uploadandlh file uploadallow sending local files or content from specific URLs to remote LobeHub storage, providing a potential path for exfiltrating sensitive local documents if the agent is compromised.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Multiple commands instruct the agent to handle sensitive credentials as plain-text CLI arguments. Examples include--api-keyfor provider configuration,--bot-tokenfor chat platform integrations, and--token(JWT) for gateway authentication. Providing secrets via command-line flags can expose them in shell history, process listings, and logs.
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