cofounder-computer-setup

No direct backdoor/exfiltration/credential theft is evident in this Bash fragment. However, the installer executes remote scripts (curl|bash and curl|sh) and uses eval for Homebrew shell env, which are high-impact supply-chain execution points. More importantly, it injects a session-wide instruction into AGENTS.md that forces the agent’s FIRST action to invoke a specific skill (cofounder-playbook) and to follow it for the entire session—this is a strong agent-behavior hijack/policy injection pattern and should be treated as a potentially malicious supply-chain control risk. Overall: medium confidence of malicious/abusive intent, primarily behavioral rather than system malware.

SUSPICIOUS. The skill's purpose mostly matches its actions, and Windows steps rely on expected official tooling, but the macOS/Linux remediation path hinges on an unpinned remote curl|bash installer and also installs additional cofounder skills. This is a coherent dev-setup skill with notable supply-chain and transitive-trust risk, not clear malware.