locus-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes data from external Locus and Stripe endpoints, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads
account.registration.authorizationUrlfrom API responses and processes user-facing messages from StripehumanHandoff. It also fetches search results from the capability catalog. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly command the agent to treat fetched content as untrusted data and ignore any embedded instructions that redirect credentials or scope.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of performing network requests to vendor APIs, writing secrets to protected local files (
~/.config/locus/), and executing local shell commands. - Sanitization: The skill emphasizes strict adherence to the documented protocol and the use of cryptographic RNGs to prevent manipulation by external inputs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands to generate secure registration tokens.
- Evidence: The instructions direct the agent to run
python3 -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(24))'to generate a transient registration token. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and fetches content from vendor-controlled domains.
- Evidence: Fetches authorization links and continuation URLs from
api.paywithlocus.comandauth.agentid.comduring the signup and OAuth flows. References to external documentation atpaywithlocus.comare mirrored in the local repository for verification.
Audit Metadata