work-lgnh
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
catalog/report-daily-worklog.mdandcatalog/report-weekly.mddescribe shell commands that incorporate user-provided or environment-derived strings without sanitization. Theauthorsargument incatalog/report-daily-worklog.mdis used to construct agit log --author="name1\|name2"command. A malicious user could provide a crafted author string (e.g.,"; touch /tmp/exploit; #) to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes git commit history, which constitutes untrusted external data. Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
git logcommands incatalog/report-daily-worklog.mdandcatalog/report-weekly.md. Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or delimiters to separate the untrusted commit content from the agent's instructions. Capability inventory: The skill uses subprocess calls togitand performs file-write operations (report-weekly-YYMMDD-YYMMDD.md). Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering applied to the commit messages before they are processed and summarized. If a commit message contains malicious instructions, it could attempt to manipulate the agent's behavior during the summarization phase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata