afk-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository and passes it directly into parallel sub-agent prompts for evaluation. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious content within the repo (e.g., in commit messages, PR descriptions, or spec files) could attempt to override the sub-agents' instructions.
- Ingestion points: Commit messages retrieved via
git log, diff content fromgit diff, issue references in metadata, and the contents of documentation/spec files in the repository (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or specific "ignore" rules to prevent the LLM from obeying instructions embedded within the processed code or metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes Git subcommands (
diff,log,ls-files) and reads file contents from the local filesystem (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or escaping repository content before it is interpolated into the prompts for the Standards and Spec sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to interact with the Git repository.
- Evidence: The workflow explicitly uses
git diff,git log,git ls-files, andgit diff --cachedto resolve the review scope and gather evidence for the sub-agents (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata