afk-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to orchestrate external processes using
cmuxandtmuxas described inreferences/transports.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
--trust-all-toolsflag when launching sub-agents inreferences/transports.md. This instruction explicitly disables the safety guardrails that require user confirmation for tool execution, creating a security bypass for the delegated agent. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads repository content to create a task brief. This pattern of reading potentially sensitive local data and transmitting it to an external agent provider via the sub-agent constitutes a data exposure risk.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection attacks because it ingests untrusted data and uses it to drive sub-agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: User input from
{{ARGUMENTS}}and project file content from.delegate-brief.mdare passed directly to the sub-agent. - Boundary markers: There are no clear delimiters or instructions within the brief to separate user-provided task descriptions from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary terminal commands and file system operations via the delegated sessions managed by
tmuxandcmux. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering for data before it is processed by the sub-agent.
Audit Metadata