api-load-tester
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill attempts to install the
heyload testing tool from a third-party GitHub repository (github.com/rakyll/hey) usinggo installif the tool is not found on the system during initialization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on executing shell commands (
hey,wrk,ab,curl) to perform load tests. User-provided inputs such as URLs, HTTP headers, and request bodies are interpolated into these commands, which presents a significant risk of command injection if the inputs contain shell metacharacters. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes a multi-line Bash script as a fallback when specialized load-testing tools are unavailable. This script uses nested loops and background processes to simulate concurrent requests using
curlwith user-supplied parameters. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of endpoint URLs and request parameters, which are then used to influence the execution of shell commands.
- Ingestion points: Endpoint URLs, authentication tokens, headers, and request bodies provided by the user as described in
SKILL.md(Workflow Step 2 and 3). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or sanitization instructions are provided to the agent to ensure that user-supplied strings are treated as data rather than executable code within the shell commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash,Read,Write,Glob, andGrepto execute network requests, handle local files, and manage report output. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation, escaping, or filtering mechanisms for user-supplied input before interpolation into CLI tool arguments.
Audit Metadata