claude-landing-composer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external inputs such as buyer personas from an 'icp-deep-scanner' and user-provided goals to generate landing page content. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where untrusted data could influence the generated code or copy.
  • Ingestion points: Processes data from other agents (icp-deep-scanner, claude-design-system-architect) and user requirements (goal, audience) in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly defined to separate untrusted data from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Uses Write to create files and Bash to execute commands (build/run server).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of external content mentioned.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the agent to generate code (Next.js components) and then 'Run the dev server / build and confirm it compiles.' This involves executing code generated at runtime, which is standard for development skills but carries inherent risks if the generation process is compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to perform build and development tasks. These commands are executed locally to verify the production readiness of the generated landing page.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 07:25 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — claude-landing-composer