claude-landing-composer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external inputs such as buyer personas from an 'icp-deep-scanner' and user-provided goals to generate landing page content. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where untrusted data could influence the generated code or copy.
- Ingestion points: Processes data from other agents (
icp-deep-scanner,claude-design-system-architect) and user requirements (goal, audience) in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined to separate untrusted data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: Uses
Writeto create files andBashto execute commands (build/run server). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of external content mentioned.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the agent to generate code (Next.js components) and then 'Run the dev server / build and confirm it compiles.' This involves executing code generated at runtime, which is standard for development skills but carries inherent risks if the generation process is compromised.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to perform build and development tasks. These commands are executed locally to verify the production readiness of the generated landing page.
Audit Metadata