gpt-image-prompt-lib
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runwithinscripts/sync_cases.pyandscripts/check_updates.pyto invoke Git commands such asgit pull,git ls-remote, andgit rev-parse. These commands are used to manage and update the local prompt library. The implementation uses list-based arguments rather than shell strings, which is a secure practice that mitigates command injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: To maintain its reference library, the skill is designed to fetch data from external community-maintained repositories on GitHub (specifically the EvoLinkAI and Anil-matcha prompt collections). This data retrieval is a documented core function necessary for the skill's operation.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes text prompts authored by third parties in external repositories.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted prompt text is parsed from external README files and stored in
references/case-library.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not currently employ specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions when the agent processes these ingested skeletons during prompt synthesis.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to synthesize final prompts and directly call the internal
image_gentool. - Sanitization: While metadata tags are validated against a predefined whitelist in
scripts/tag-vocabulary.yaml, the primary prompt content used for image generation is used as a template without extensive sanitization.
Audit Metadata