video-publisher
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/v2/run-platform.mjsdynamically assembles a JavaScript execution payload by concatenating multiple local files, includingcore.mjs, platform-specific adapters (e.g.,bilibili.mjs), anddispatch.mjs. This combined source string is then executed as a Node.js script via theego-browserCLI tool. While the source components are local to the skill, this runtime assembly and execution pattern is a form of dynamic execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted metadata from user-supplied
package.jsonfiles, such as video titles and descriptions, which are interpolated into browser automation logic. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through the
readPackagefunction inscripts/lib/content-package.mjs, which parses platform-specific metadata from a local JSON file. - Boundary markers: The skill performs field-level validation in
scripts/lib/content-package.mjs(e.g., checking for character limits and forbidden hashtag formats), but it does not utilize explicit boundary markers or safety instructions to wrap the interpolated text when passed to the browser environment. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including persistent file system writes (
scripts/v2/lib/job-store.mjs), browser process management (scripts/v2/run-platform.mjs), and local command execution (scripts/v2/publisher.mjs). - Sanitization: The skill mitigates basic injection risks by using
JSON.stringifyto escape user-supplied strings before they are embedded into the JavaScript fragments sent to the browser inscripts/v2/run-platform.mjs.
Audit Metadata