code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses user-supplied input to construct shell commands. The
<fixed-point>identifier provided by the user is directly interpolated into commands such asgit diff <fixed-point>...HEAD,git log <fixed-point>..HEAD, andgit rev-parse <fixed-point>. Without proper sanitization or use of safe APIs, a malicious user could provide a string containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from the repository environment and passes it to sub-agents without isolation.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads content from
git diff,git log, and various specification/documentation files (e.g.,CODING_STANDARDS.md,specs/*) which may contain instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate the ingested untrusted content from the system instructions provided to the parallel sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read files, execute git commands, and spawn sub-agents that can process and potentially act upon injected instructions.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content fetched from files or git history before it is interpolated into the prompts for the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata