issue-refine-loop

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted GitHub issue titles, bodies, and comments, which could contain malicious directives intended to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested via the read_issue operation during Phase 0 and Phase 2 (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill requires the agent to snapshot the original body and use a hidden marker <!-- issue-refine-loop:v1 --> to separate its work.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can update issue bodies, post comments, set labels, and execute shell commands via Bash (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill explicitly identifies issue content as untrusted and instructs the agent to ignore directives like 'ignore your instructions' or 'run this command,' instead recording them in a closing comment (SKILL.md, Untrusted Input section).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to interact with the GitHub CLI (gh), creating a potential surface for command injection if untrusted issue content is handled improperly.
  • Evidence: The allowed-tools includes Bash (SKILL.md), and the binding of abstract operations to the gh CLI is detailed in the GitHub Surface Reference (references/github-surface.md).
  • Mitigation: The skill mandates the use of mktemp -d and literal heredocs (<<'EOF') to ensure that markdown content containing special characters (like backticks or dollar signs) is passed to the CLI without shell expansion or execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 17, 2026, 04:16 AM