issue-refine-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted GitHub issue titles, bodies, and comments, which could contain malicious directives intended to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via the
read_issueoperation during Phase 0 and Phase 2 (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill requires the agent to snapshot the original body and use a hidden marker
<!-- issue-refine-loop:v1 -->to separate its work. - Capability inventory: The skill can update issue bodies, post comments, set labels, and execute shell commands via Bash (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: The skill explicitly identifies issue content as untrusted and instructs the agent to ignore directives like 'ignore your instructions' or 'run this command,' instead recording them in a closing comment (SKILL.md, Untrusted Input section).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to interact with the GitHub CLI (gh), creating a potential surface for command injection if untrusted issue content is handled improperly. - Evidence: The
allowed-toolsincludesBash(SKILL.md), and the binding of abstract operations to theghCLI is detailed in the GitHub Surface Reference (references/github-surface.md). - Mitigation: The skill mandates the use of
mktemp -dand literal heredocs (<<'EOF') to ensure that markdown content containing special characters (like backticks or dollar signs) is passed to the CLI without shell expansion or execution.
Audit Metadata