triaging-pr-reviews
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon pull request review comments and conversation logs, which are external, untrusted inputs. The skill explicitly mitigates this risk by requiring the agent to verify every claim against the actual code and existing tests before implementation.
- Ingestion points: Pull request context, review comments, and conversation-tab comments are fetched via GitHub APIs in
SKILL.md(Phase 1). - Boundary markers: Instructions in
SKILL.mdmandate that the user 'Never implement a suggestion you haven't traced through the code' and warn that automated reviewers lack full context. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Edit,Write, andBashinSKILL.md(Phase 6) for code modification andmcp__githubfor resolving threads. - Sanitization: Verification steps in Phase 3 and evaluation in Phase 5 of
SKILL.mdrequire matching reviewer descriptions to code and checking for regression tests. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
ghCLI andBashto perform repository operations. As described inreferences/gh-binding.md, it follows security best practices by using files for command bodies (-F body=@"$REPLY_FILE") to avoid shell injection vulnerabilities when interacting with the GitHub API. - [SAFE]: The skill includes logic in
references/github-surface.mdto detect restricted environment variables (e.g.,proxy-injectedtokens) to ensure it does not attempt unauthorized network operations in restricted environments. It also explicitly forbids the agent from installing new software (gh) to resolve missing dependencies.
Audit Metadata