skills/lovstudio/bp-skill/lov-bp-deck/Gen Agent Trust Hub

lov-bp-deck

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-controlled content from outline.md and assets during the rendering workflow.
  • Ingestion points: Reads outline.md and source notes provided by the user in Step 1 and Step 4.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the user's outline.
  • Capability inventory: The skill invokes the lov-any2deck tool, writes files to the local filesystem (deck-manifest.md, PPTX, PDF, images), and performs visual QA.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the outline's content is described before it is passed to the rendering tool.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires the agent to invoke external tools and commands.
  • Evidence: Step 4 explicitly instructs the agent to 'Invoke lov-any2deck using the approved outline and chosen style'.
  • Evidence: The README.md suggests installation via npx skills add bp-deck, which involves executing a package runner to add the skill.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external dependencies and installation processes.
  • Evidence: The README.md and SKILL.md identify lov-any2deck and lov-branding-consistency as external dependencies required for the skill to function.
  • Evidence: The workflow assumes these tools are available in the active Agent Skills environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 03:18 AM