lovstudio-bp-deck

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the user's configuration file located at the path defined by ${LOVSTUDIO_SKILLS_PROFILE:-$HOME/.lovstudio/skills/profile.json} to resolve settings such as workspace roots, output directories, and brand assets.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires invoking an external vendor tool, lovstudio-any2deck, to transform narrative outlines into rendered slide decks in PPTX and PDF formats.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from user-provided outline.md files and evidence notes. This data is processed and passed to the rendering tool, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions hidden in the input files could attempt to manipulate the rendering outcome or workflow.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided outline.md narrative and evidence/source notes referenced in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or security warnings to be used when interpolating the outline content into the rendering tool.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing multiple files to the business-plan/ directory and executing the lovstudio-any2deck command as documented in the workflow.
  • Sanitization: The workflow instructions specify checks for narrative consistency and data accuracy but do not include explicit programmatic sanitization or filtering of the input content before processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 7, 2026, 10:18 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lovstudio-bp-deck