lov-bp-outline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data (project documents, PRDs, analytics exports, and websites) in Step 1 of the workflow. This data is interpolated into the agent's context to generate the business plan outline, presenting a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 in
SKILL.mdidentifies repository files, URLs, and analytics exports as input sources. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimitation (e.g., XML tags or clear separators) to isolate external content from the skill's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-system write capabilities (via the workspace initialization script) and the ability to process multiple data sources.
- Sanitization: While the initialization script uses
slugifyfor file paths, there is no evidence of sanitization for the textual content of ingested documents. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script
scripts/init_bp.pyduring its mandatory workflow to set up the workspace. - Evidence: The workflow in
SKILL.mdinvokespython3 "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/init_bp.py" --name "Project Name" --stage seed --output ./business-plan. - Analysis: The script is bundled with the skill and performs path resolution and template rendering. It includes safety checks (
ensure_safe_destination) to prevent writing to sensitive directories like the system root or the user's home directory.
Audit Metadata