lov-clone-rebrand
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external project templates and forks which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent.
- Ingestion point: Reads template project files, configuration, and documentation during the rebranding process (Workflow Steps 1-3).
- Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters or warnings to separate ingested content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system access, Git repository operations, and shell command execution.
- Sanitization: Absent. While it filters sensitive keys in its profile storage script, it does not explicitly sanitize text ingested from projects before use.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill triggers the execution of deployment and publishing workflows defined within the project it is rebranding.
- Evidence: Workflow Step 5 specifies using the "current project's publishing process" for deployment tasks.
- Risk: This pattern involves executing local scripts or commands found within untrusted project templates.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to perform file system operations and Git tasks.
- Evidence: The execution boundary in
SKILL.mdexplicitly mentions utilizing CLI tools provided by the host environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is capable of reading local project content and transmitting it to remote Git repositories.
- Evidence: Workflow Step 4 describes creating and pushing to new GitHub repositories.
- Note: The skill includes logic in Workflow Step 3 to ensure credential values are not copied during the rebranding process.
Audit Metadata