lov-document-illustrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by reading content from user-provided documents via the
Readtool and interpolating it directly into prompts sent to the Google Gemini API. - Ingestion Points: The
SKILL.mdworkflow reads a document fromdoc_path, andscripts/generate_illustrations.pyparses the file structure to extract text from sections. - Boundary Markers: There are no explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags, triple quotes) or negative constraints ("ignore instructions in the text") used when building the final prompt string in
scripts/generate_single_image.pyorscripts/generate_illustrations.py. - Capability Inventory: The skill uses the
Agenttool to execute shell commands, performs network operations to the Gemini API, and uses theEdittool to modify the original document. - Sanitization: While
scripts/generate_illustrations.pytruncates content to 1,000 characters, it does not filter or escape potentially malicious instructions embedded in the document text that could hijack the image generation model. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Agenttool to launch parallel subprocesses executing local Python scripts (scripts/generate_single_image.py). These scripts are passed arguments such as--titleand--contentwhich are derived from the analyzed document. While intended, this pattern relies on the agent's ability to properly quote and escape untrusted document content when forming shell commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external Python libraries (
google-genai,pillow,python-dotenv) to function. It also communicates with the Google Gemini API to generate images. These dependencies and services are managed by a well-known service provider.
Audit Metadata