lov-finder-action
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill incorporates templates and logic to use the
com.apple.security.temporary-exception.files.absolute-path.read-writeentitlement. This is explicitly documented in the changelog as a 'helper app pattern to bypass sandbox restrictions,' allowing the generated extensions to access system files outside the standard application sandbox. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The Swift templates in
references/applescript-iterm.swiftuseNSAppleScriptto execute command strings constructed at runtime. This allows the execution of arbitrary AppleScript, including opening terminal sessions and executing directory changes. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes natural language requests to generate build configurations (
xcodegen-template.yml) and Swift source code (finder-sync-template.swift). Maliciously crafted user input could potentially influence the resulting logic or permissions of the generated binaries. - Ingestion points: Natural language requests in
SKILL.mdand user profile data viascripts/profile_store.py. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on natural language boundary descriptions but lacks strict character-level escaping for code generation.
- Capability inventory: File system write access for project creation and CLI execution for building/registering extensions (
xcodebuild,xcodegen,pluginkit). - Sanitization:
scripts/profile_store.pyimplements a filter to prevent storing keys containing sensitive strings like 'token', 'secret', or 'password'. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple local system utilities and Python scripts to function, including building macOS binaries and validating skill structures.
Audit Metadata