lov-finder-action

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill incorporates templates and logic to use the com.apple.security.temporary-exception.files.absolute-path.read-write entitlement. This is explicitly documented in the changelog as a 'helper app pattern to bypass sandbox restrictions,' allowing the generated extensions to access system files outside the standard application sandbox.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The Swift templates in references/applescript-iterm.swift use NSAppleScript to execute command strings constructed at runtime. This allows the execution of arbitrary AppleScript, including opening terminal sessions and executing directory changes.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes natural language requests to generate build configurations (xcodegen-template.yml) and Swift source code (finder-sync-template.swift). Maliciously crafted user input could potentially influence the resulting logic or permissions of the generated binaries.
  • Ingestion points: Natural language requests in SKILL.md and user profile data via scripts/profile_store.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill relies on natural language boundary descriptions but lacks strict character-level escaping for code generation.
  • Capability inventory: File system write access for project creation and CLI execution for building/registering extensions (xcodebuild, xcodegen, pluginkit).
  • Sanitization: scripts/profile_store.py implements a filter to prevent storing keys containing sensitive strings like 'token', 'secret', or 'password'.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple local system utilities and Python scripts to function, including building macOS binaries and validating skill structures.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 18, 2026, 04:28 PM