lov-fix-general
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core workflow involves ingesting untrusted data such as error logs, source code, and configuration files to diagnose issues. If this external content contains malicious instructions, it could influence the agent's behavior during the fixing process. \n
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdworkflow steps 1 and 2 (reading errors, code, and config). \n - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdexplicitly separates analysis and preview requests as read-only, while modification and deployment follow explicit user scopes. \n - Capability inventory: The skill can write files (
SKILL.mdstep 3) and execute verification commands (SKILL.mdstep 4). \n - Sanitization:
scripts/profile_store.pyimplements keyword filtering to prevent storing secrets, but no explicit sanitization is documented for the ingested logs and code files during diagnosis. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: TheSKILL.mdworkflow requires the agent to run verification checks for reproduction and testing, which involves executing shell commands or project-specific scripts within the host environment. \n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The process of implementing and verifying software fixes requires the agent to generate or modify code and subsequently execute it to verify the solution. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Thescripts/validate_skill.pyutility requires thePyYAMLPython package to be installed from an external registry for metadata validation.
Audit Metadata