lov-gen-project-name
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes arbitrary text describing project purposes to generate name suggestions, representing a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: User-provided project descriptions and purpose statements processed in the primary workflow (SKILL.md).\n
- Boundary markers: Defined in SKILL.md under 'Execution boundary', specifying read-only analysis and explicit scopes for modifications.\n
- Capability inventory: File system access via
scripts/profile_store.pyand metadata validation viascripts/validate_skill.py.\n - Sanitization: The profile management script (
scripts/profile_store.py) prevents the storage of sensitive keys (tokens, passwords, secrets, etc.) using a case-insensitive blacklist and validates identifiers using regex. Slugs are restricted to alphanumeric characters and hyphens.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes Python scripts designed to manage local configuration and validate skill integrity through file system operations.\n - Evidence:
scripts/profile_store.pyperforms atomic writes to a shared profile JSON located in the user's config directory (e.g.,~/.config/agent-skills/profile.json).\n - Evidence:
scripts/validate_skill.pyparses YAML frontmatter and validates skill metadata, requiring thePyYAMLlibrary for execution.
Audit Metadata