lov-gh-contribute
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches metadata and instructional files from external repositories to guide its behavior, which introduces a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves
CONTRIBUTING.md,CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md, and.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.mdfrom the upstream repository inSKILL.md(Step 2). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of boundary markers or safety delimiters when interpolating this external content into the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform file reads, repository forking, branch creation, commits, pushes, and opening pull requests using the
ghandgittools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the fetched remote content before it is used to generate commit messages and pull request descriptions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on the execution of shell commands to interact with the local environment and GitHub.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddocuments a workflow involving multiple shell invocations ofgitandghCLI tools (Steps 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8) to manage version control and repository interactions.
Audit Metadata