lov-gh-tidy
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub issues, pull requests, and labels, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested through
gh issue list,gh pr list, andgh label listcommands as specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions are defined to separate external data from the system prompt or to instruct the agent to ignore embedded instructions in the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant repository modification capabilities, including closing issues, merging PRs, and deleting branches/labels (
gh issue close,gh pr merge,git push origin --delete,gh label delete). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation for the data retrieved from GitHub before it is summarized for the user.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs destructive repository operations.
- Evidence: The workflow includes commands for deleting remote branches via
git push origin --deleteand removing labels withgh label delete. - Context: These actions are core to the skill's purpose and are gated by a mandatory
AskUserQuestionstep, requiring explicit user approval before execution.
Audit Metadata