skills/lovstudio/skills/lov-gh-tidy/Gen Agent Trust Hub

lov-gh-tidy

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub issues, pull requests, and labels, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested through gh issue list, gh pr list, and gh label list commands as specified in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions are defined to separate external data from the system prompt or to instruct the agent to ignore embedded instructions in the fetched data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant repository modification capabilities, including closing issues, merging PRs, and deleting branches/labels (gh issue close, gh pr merge, git push origin --delete, gh label delete).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation for the data retrieved from GitHub before it is summarized for the user.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs destructive repository operations.
  • Evidence: The workflow includes commands for deleting remote branches via git push origin --delete and removing labels with gh label delete.
  • Context: These actions are core to the skill's purpose and are gated by a mandatory AskUserQuestion step, requiring explicit user approval before execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 24, 2026, 12:55 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lov-gh-tidy