lov-illustrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPERSISTENCEDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill uses
scripts/profile_store.pyto maintain state across sessions by writing to local configuration files in the user's home directory (e.g.,~/.config/agent-skills/profile.json). This is used to store 'durable decisions' and preferences. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local configuration files to retrieve user identity, brand preferences, and workspace settings. While it implements a filter to prevent the storage of sensitive keys such as 'token' or 'password', it represents a mechanism for the agent to access and store user-specific information.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/audit_html_fonts.pyutilizes the Playwright library to launch a Chromium browser instance for introspecting font rendering in HTML/CSS templates via the Chrome DevTools Protocol. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The illustration workflow involves downloading images and assets from external sources using
curlbased on entity extraction and search results derived from the input document. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possess a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted Markdown documents and uses their content to generate prompts for image generation. 1. Ingestion points: Markdown files provided as the
file_pathargument. 2. Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the extracted entities. 3. Capability inventory: Network access (curl), browser automation (playwright), and file writing to theattachments/directory. 4. Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or validation of the extracted document content before its interpolation into AI generation prompts.
Audit Metadata