lov-init-port
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [SAFE]: The skill implements security best practices in its accompanying scripts. The
profile_store.pyutility explicitly identifies and blocks the persistence of sensitive data such as tokens, secrets, passwords, and API keys through a pre-defined blocklist (SENSITIVE_PARTS). Furthermore, it uses atomic write operations and secure temporary files for profile updates. - [SAFE]: The source validation script (
validate_skill.py) usesyaml.safe_loadto prevent insecure YAML deserialization attacks and includes hygiene checks to prevent the leakage of private absolute file paths from the author's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted project data.
- Ingestion points: The workflow reads project names and framework configuration files (e.g.,
package.json, Vite/Next.js configs) from the target workspace to determine existing port settings. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly use boundary markers, but its execution is strictly limited by the defined workflow in
SKILL.mdwhich focuses on port arithmetic and configuration writing. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the agent's filesystem capabilities to modify configuration files in the target project.
- Sanitization: The skill incorporates sanitization via
profile_store.pywhich filters sensitive keywords before storing any data in the persistent profile.
Audit Metadata