lov-media-fetch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule inscripts/aria2_acquire.pyandscripts/verify_media.pyto interact witharia2candffprobe. These calls are implemented using list-based arguments without the shell=True parameter, which effectively mitigates the risk of shell injection from untrusted inputs like media titles or magnet URIs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted metadata from external media sources and search results. It implements appropriate safeguards to prevent this data from influencing the agent's logic or system security. Evidence chain: (1) Ingestion points: External magnet URIs, torrent files, and search result JSON in
scripts/qbittorrent_search.py; (2) Boundary markers: The skill enforces job isolation using specific probe directories and unique job IDs; (3) Capability inventory: Subprocess calls are restricted to thearia2candffprobebinaries for download and verification tasks; (4) Sanitization: Input data is treated as literal strings within subprocess argument lists. - [SAFE]: The skill handles configuration and credentials securely, explicitly advising users to store sensitive information like qBittorrent passwords in environment variables or the operating system's credential store rather than in code or configuration files. No evidence of data exfiltration, obfuscation, or persistence mechanisms was found.
Audit Metadata