lov-media-fetch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python's
subprocessmodule to execute external binaries includingaria2c(inscripts/aria2_acquire.py) andffprobe(inscripts/verify_media.py). While these calls use list-based arguments to prevent shell injection, they involve running system-level tools with parameters derived from external inputs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to fetch content from user-provided URLs and Magnet links. It also interacts with qBittorrent's Web API (
scripts/qbittorrent_acquire.py) and potentially other search plugins to discover and download media from various internet sources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: There is an inherent attack surface where the skill ingests untrusted data from the internet (e.g., media file metadata, torrent content, and filenames). This data is processed by
ffprobeand used to generate reports, which could potentially influence downstream agent decisions if malicious instructions were embedded in media metadata. - Ingestion points: External media URLs and Magnet links are ingested in
scripts/aria2_acquire.pyandscripts/qbittorrent_acquire.py. Media files are processed inscripts/verify_media.py. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured JSON schemas (
references/candidate-schema.md) to isolate data, but explicit delimiters to ignore instructions within processed media metadata are not present. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
aria2c,ffprobe), write to the local filesystem, and perform network requests viaurllib. - Sanitization: The skill employs list-based argument passing for subprocesses, which mitigates direct shell injection vulnerabilities.
Audit Metadata