lov-output-wechat-moment
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process user-supplied content or existing text to generate social media copy, which creates an attack surface for instructions embedded within that data.\n
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdworkflow step 1 reads user-specified content or currently confirmed text.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/authorship-integrity.mdspecify that the agent should only write supported experiences, maintain accurate brand names, and preserve specific verbatim text.\n - Capability inventory: The skill possesses filesystem write capabilities (
SKILL.mdstep 4) to save output files and read/write capabilities viascripts/profile_store.py.\n - Sanitization: The workflow requires avoiding markdown formatting noise and explicitly forbids fabricating links or personal information not supported by the source.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a persistent profile management system using the
scripts/profile_store.pyscript. This script writes user-stated preferences and identity facts to a local JSON file (e.g.,~/.config/agent-skills/profile.json), allowing state to be maintained across sessions.\n - Evidence: The
profile_store.pyscript usesatomic_writeto replace the profile file andset_pathto update specific fields. It includes a security check to reject paths containing sensitive keywords like 'token', 'secret', or 'password'.
Audit Metadata